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This paper discusses Albert Hirschman´s writings that resulted from his professional 
experience in Colombia, Brazil, Chile and other Latin American countries during the 
1950s and 1960s. The focus is on the trilogy written by Hirschman in the field of 
development economics, which comprises: The Strategy of Economic Development 
(1958), Journeys Toward Progress (1963)  and Development Projects Observed (1967).  
Some methodological aspects of those writings, which tend to be recurrent throughout the 
author´s whole intelectual career, are emphasized. 
Resumo: 
Este trabalho discute os escritos de Albert Hirschman que resultaram de sua experiência 
profissional na Colômbia, no Brasil, no Chile e em outros países latino-americanos, 
durante as décadas de 1950 e 1960. Ele analisa a trilogia escrita por Hirschman no campo 
de desenvolvimento econômico, que compreende: The Strategy of Economic 
Development (1958), Journeys Toward Progress (1963) e Development Projects 
Observed (1967). Alguns aspectos metodológicos desses escritos, que tendem a persistir 
em toda a carreira intelectual do autor , são enfatizados.     1
Albert Hirschman in Latin America: Notes on Hirschman´s Trilogy on 
Economic Development 
 
“Attempts to confine me to a specific area make me unhappy. When it seems that 
an idea can be verified in another field, then I am happy to venture in this 
direction.” 
(Albert Hirschman, Crossing Boundaries, 1998) 
Have political commitments shaped the theoretical work of individual thinkers? Was 
there any influence in the opposite direction? 
In the case of Albert Hirschman [1915-    ], the questions posed by the organizing 
committe of the 9
th Annual European Conference on the History of Economics can be 
answered with a double “yes”: yes, Hirschman´s political commitments shaped his 
theoretical work; and yes, his theoretical framework heavily influenced Latin American 
politicians in their preachments and practices.  
This paper will focus Hirschman´s writings that resulted from his professional experience 
in Colombia, Brazil, Chile and other Latin American countries. More specifically, the 
subject matter of this paper will be the trilogy where Hirschman writes about 
development economics, which comprises: The Strategy of Economic Development 
(1958, hereafter The Strategy), Journeys Toward Progress (1963/1968, hereafter 
Journeys)  and Development Projects Observed (1967, hereafter Development Projects). 
Other texts on the same topic published by the author will also be mentioned. 
One interesting thing of writing about Hirschman is the fact that he goes back again and 
again to the same subjects, restating his propositions, looking them from a different angle 
and reintroducing his arguments in a modified manner. In a sense, it looks as if he has 
been writing a single book during all his life. Even after he moved away from 
development economics, he went back to concepts built up in his earlier writings in 
pieces such as Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970, hereafter Exit), A Bias for Hope (1971, 
hereafter Bias for Hope), Essays in Trespassing (1981, hereafter Essays), “A Dissenter´s 
Confession: Revisiting the Strategy of Economic Development” (1984, hereafter 
Dissenter´s Confession), Rival Views of Market Society and Other Recent Essays (1986, 
hereafter Rival Views), Crossing Boundaries (1998, hereafter Crossing Boundaries) and 
A Propensity to Self-Subversion (1995, hereafter Propensity).    
The fact that Hirschman goes back to the same topics defies the historian of ideas to 
distinguish what he wrote in an earlier phase of his career from what he later says about 
what he wrote. This challenge will not be met in this paper, due to its preliminary 
character. Rather, I will focus on the basic content of each book constituting the trilogy, 
to which the next three sections will be devoted. In the concluding section I will discuss a 
few methodological features of Hirschman´s contribution to development economics.    2
1.  The Strategy 
When Hirschman first arrived in Latin America, in 1952, Colombia was a very poor 
country, with a population of 12,6 million people. Life expectancy at birth was 50,6 years 
and the annual rate of population increase exceeded 3 percent, one of the highest rates in 
the world. The Colombian economy was primarily agricultural, with 60 per cent of the 
population living in rural areas and the agricultural sector being responsible for 40 per 
cent of the GDP. 
Sarmiento (1992) points out that the economic structure then prevailing “was well geared 
to perpetuate underdevelopment”. While exports were based on highly inelastic primary 
products, the production of industrial and agricultural consumer goods was contingent on 
imports of intermediate and capital goods. Foreign exchange was scarce and there were 
limited opportunities for expanding primary exports, a bottleneck that had been well 
characterized by Raúl Prebisch in the introduction to a document issued by ECLA, the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA, 1951). In 1950 
Colombia took its first steps towards industrial development: the government established 
a system of tariffs and refined and codified policy measures intended to protect new-born 
industries, which would soon generate its first fruits. (Sarmiento, 1992).  
In a lengthy interview that he gave to three Italian researchers (Crossing Boundaries), 
Hirschman points out that the fact that his interests had shifted to the problems of 
development in the so-called backward countries was responsible for his decision to 
move to Colombia. He had spent the seven years immediately before that working as an 
economist with the Federal Reserve Board. His activities basically involved projects 
concerning Europe´s economic reconstruction, under the Marshall Plan´s concept. “A bit 
tired” of circling around the same problems, as he explains, he decided to move to 
Colombia, as a consultant to the newly established National Planning Council, by 
indication of the World Bank.
1  
So Hirschman went to Colombia in 1952 working out a contract with the Colombian 
government. He was then almost 37 years and had already published several articles, but 
just one of the many books that he would publish later in his life. One year after his 
arrival the country experienced a coup d´état led by Rojas Pinilla, the head of the armed 
forces, which launched a period of civil strife, martial law and violent rule. From the 
viewpoint of its industrial development, however, there was progress in the 1950s.
2  
Hirschman´s stay in Colombia lasted almost five years. After working in straight 
connection with the Colombian Government, for the first two years, he spent the rest of 
his stay serving as a a private economic and financial adviser. In 1956 he returned to the 
United States, where he settled at Yale University. But he made several other trips to 
                                                 
1 Actually, Hirschman revealed in the interview that he had two possibilites: moving to Colombia 
(the preferred option) or going to Europe with the European Payments Europe. He took the first 
road because he was attracted by the novelty of it. (Crossing, p. 80)  
2 In Journeys (pp.123-125) Hirschman talks about the dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla and his 
Minister of Finance, Carlos Villaveces.    3
Central and South America, to visit World Bank finance projects. The same interest in 
development economics took him to developing countries in Asia and Africa.  
This was the overall scenario which inspired Hirschman to write the The Strategy, first 
published in 1958. The book builds on some basic processes making for economic 
progress in  developing countries. It favors the establishment of industries with strong 
backward linkages, as a strategy to promote development. The unbalanced growth pattern 
resulting from the generalized adoption of this strategy -- which the author would later 
picture as a “remarkable social invention by means of which pluralist politics and the 
achievement of multiple social objectives can be reconciled” (Dissenter´s, p.109) -- 
generated much controversy in the field of development economics. Nevertheless, a 
formalized version of the notion of linkages was assimilated by mainstream economics, 
in the form of development indices that identify key sectors in the economy. It became 
common knowledge among economists who concentrate their research efforts in 
development theory.
3  
From the viewpoint of this central thesis, the main chapter in The Strategy is chapter 4, 
where Hirschman puts forward the idea of an unbalanced development strategy. The 
chapter´s title (“Unbalanced growth: an espousal”) explicitates this overall commitment 
to the idea of development as a “chain of disequilibria”:  
…our aim must be to keep alive rather than eliminate the disequilibria of which 
profits and losses are symptons in a competitive economy. If the economy is to be 
kept moving ahead, the task of development policy is to maintain tensions, 
disproportions, and disequilibria. That nightmare of equilibrium economics, the 
endlessly spinning cobweb, is the kind of mechanism we must assiduously look for 
as an invaluable help in the development process. (The Strategy, p.66) 
This bold proposition emphasizes the disorderly nature of economic development. It 
challenges the generalizations and theoretical viewpoints that prevailed among 
economists dealing with development problems up to that point in time.
4 In the previous 
chapter (“Balanced growth: A critique”) Hirschman had attacked the balanced growth 
thesis that was advocated by his forerunners in the field. He argued that problems of 
industrialization did not require a simultaneous solution, as claimed by economists such 
as Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurkse, Lewis and Scitovsky. Quite the opposite: new 
industrialization processes would allow for a number of sequential solutions which where 
essentially different from those followed by the older industrial countries. Instead of 
emphasizing the various obstacles to economic progress -- land tenure systems, family 
structure, administrative instability, lack of savings and so on --, Hirschman chose to put 
stress on the need for inducement mechanisms. In his view, the fundamental problem of 
development consisted in generating and channeling human energies into a desired 
direction. (The Strategy, p. 25) 
                                                 
3 See Sonis et al (1995) for an application. 
4 As the author would later admit in his career: “To write in praise of lack of balance is evidently 
a provocation for which a price must be paid.” (Dissenter´s, p. 104)   4
In Hirschman´s conception, backward linkages corresponded to the stimuli going to 
sectors that supplied the inputs required by a particular activity, whereas forward linkages 
were the inducement to set up new activities utilizing the output of the proposed activity.  
The main source of development would be activities with high potential linkage effects, 
mainly backward ones.  
The idea that industrial development should (and in fact would) proceed largely through 
backward linkages was quite revolutionary at the time: instead of  doing things in the 
conventional way, industrial development would work its way from the “last touches” to 
intermediate and basic industry. Industrialization of certain leading sectors would pull 
along the rest of the economy. In this sense, it was not be feasible nor desirable to 
suppress the tensions and disequilibria created by the development process, since there 
was a “creative virtue” on them. 
If disequilibrium is an intentional mechanism, how is balance to be restored? Hirschman 
pictures it as a result of pressures, incentives and compulsions. He suggests that the 
efficient path toward economic development is often found in circumstances where the 
country has to fin solution for bottlenecks and shortages of skills, facilities, services, and 
products.  
Although Hirschman talks about both the pecuniary and the technological effects in 
linkages, he gives more attention to the first ones. Important backward linkages would 
operate through increases in profits to supplying industries as the demand for their 
products goes up. As for forward linkages, they would derive from cost reductions that 
would increase the achievable profits of potential users. 
Whereas in Chapter 4 of the The Strategy Hirschman relies on theoretical considerations 
to support his main thesis, in Chapter 8 he takes in account empirical evidence about the 
industrialization process going on in Colombia. He suggests that less developed countries 
might have a comparative advantage in tasks such as running of airlines, rather than in 
tasks such as building and maintaining highways. Why would that be so? Because in the 
latter the compulsion to maintain is not strong – lack of maintenance leads to a slow 
deterioration in the quality and quantity of output or to temporary demages to a few 
machines, without immediate drastic consequences. In contrast, lack of maintenance in 
the airlines sector implies severe panalities, including the massive loss of life and 
property. The conclusion logically follows: contrarily to common sense, underdeveloped 
countries might achieve considerable success in ventures with a complicated technology. 
The maintenance habit can be acquired and then spread to the rest of the economy. (The 
Strategy, p. 142)  
Hirschman then proceeds to a generalization: under certain circumstances, it could be 
rational for governments in underdeveloped countries to concentrate on “show-pieces”, 
since, when undertaking the construction of a large hydroelectric station or of a steel mill, 
governments “simply  cannot afford to let such ventures go wrong … it places itself 
under a far stronger compulsion to ´deliver´ than if it were to spend the same funds on a 
large number of small projects”. (The Strategy, p.144) Due to their strong backward 
linkages, certain highly capital-intensive industries are particularly well suited for   5
underdeveloped countries. Those ‘cart-before-the-horse’ sequences would characterize 
the process of economic and social development of latecomers. 
Syrquin (1992) points out that, although similar ideas can be found in authors such as 
Rostow, Gerschenkron, and Perroux, Hirschman was the sole economist to bring over the 
idea of linkages as a feature to guide a deliberate strategy of development. Linkages, 
claims Syrquin, connote interdependence. We can use the term to point to interrrelations 
in a general equilibrium system, where everything depends on everything, but also to 
denote a variety of multiplier effects, including spillover and other external effects.  In 
the Strategy, the concept acquired a more specific and concrete meaning, standing for 
inducement mechanisms at work within the sector of directly productive activities.  
Looking back at this thesis in Propensity, Hirschman claims that the core of his argument 
was making a case against “one thing at a time”. Latecomers in the industrialization 
process should follow an original path, defined as an “unbalanced growth” sequence. 
Industrial development in less developed countries typically proceeded  by means of 
backward linkages, which was the correct way to go, since sequential problem-solving 
involved the risk of getting stuck (an idea that he would come back to in Bias).  
A similar idea is found in the jeopardy thesis, which Hirschman developed at a later 
stage, in Rhetoric and again in Propensity. Defenders of this thesis claim that a step 
forward might jeopardize an earlier progressive step that is to be valued more highly than 
the one under discussion. For Hirschman, the jeopardy thesis would be well applied to 
countries like England, with a whole history of gradual political and social change. 
However, it  did not apply to countries that did not have that sort of gradual history of 
political and social reform. With intermediate and capital goods being available from 
abroad, the latecomers were able “to move leisurely, in accordance with the backward 
linkage dynamic, from the last stages of production to the earlier ones and on to the 
production of capital goods”. (Propensity, p.73) This was not the case with pioneers, who 
were bound to produce concurrently all their industrial inputs including their own capital 
goods, “if only by artisan methods”.  
In the conclusion of The Strategy, Hirschman looks to his own argument “in perspective” 
(p.208), and makes some cautionary remarks about the bold theses that he had proposed 
in the previous chapters. He admits a certain uneasiness about the importance and 
creative virtue that was attributed to pressures, tensions, and disequilibrium. Likewise, he 
concedes that the response to such situations might at times be destructive, a danger that 
“we certainly would not want to disregard”. (p.208)
 5 But this does not imply that such 
tensions were undesirable and should not occur (p. 209). In fact, underdeveloped 
countries were already operating under the grand tension that was triggered by “the 
universal desire for economic improvement oddly combined with many resistances to 
change”. How could one make the most of this positive relation between development 
                                                 
5 In “The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin America”, written 
10 years later the Strategy and published in Bias, Hirschman recognizes the possibility of 
industrial development “getting stuck”, turning to be incapable of further extension.    6
and the tensions it creates? By means of extending technical assistance and policy advice 
to underdeveloped countries, answers the author.  
In a paper published in 1962 with Charles E. Lindblom (reprinted in Bias), Hirschman 
presents a formalized version of the concept of linkages. The authors draw a simplified 
geometrical representation of balanced vs. unbalanced growth, based on a two sectors 
economy.
6  They proceed by mentioning other writers who developed a similar work, a 
group that includes, besides Lindblom himself,  B. Klein and W. Mecklin.  
Hirschman attributes the success of his concept of linkages to the fact that it was more 
operational and less fuzzy than the alternative concepts, as he writes in an essay reprinted 
in Essays (p…).
7 As national input-output tables rapidly accumulated, a substantial 
number of empirical estimates of backward and forward linkages began to be published, 
accompanied by methodological literature on the measurement of linkages. (Hirschman 
would return to this concept in 1977, adding several new linkages and further 
generalizing the concept.)  
2.  Journeys 
The second book in Hirschman´s trilogy, Journeys Toward Progress, published in 1963, 
deals with the political processes involved in the economic changes pictured in The 
Strategy. It was brought underway during the summer of 1960, when the author took an  
extended two-stages trip to Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Argentina and Brazil. He wanted to 
learn how public authorities in Latin America worked to solve their countries´s severe 
social problems. This endeavor resulted in a sucessfull attempt to grasp a Latin American 
peculiar way of handling policy problems, with its virtues and shortcomings. 
As Heckscher points out in the introduction, while heading the XXth Century Fund, 
Hirschman realized the difficulties of generalizing about policy-making processes in 
Latin America, and proposed to the Fund a study “that would attempt to reach 
conclusions through painstaking observation of the sequence of policy-making around 
significant policy problems”.  Journeys is the fruit of this effort, defined by its author as 
“a hazardous expedition into the vast no man´s land stretching between economics and 
other social sciences such as political science, sociology, and history” (Journeys, p.ix) 
The book begins by analysing three concrete cases: Brazil, Colombia and Chile. These 
three stories, told in Part I, are seen by Hirschman as constituting the essence of the book.  
The author begins the book by criticizing sociologists like McClelland and Hagen who 
stressed the role of entrepreneurial decision-making in the take-off for development. He 
argues, instead, that decision-making plays a considerable role in all stages of 
development (p. 3, emphasis). He also questions the laissez-faire doctrine in economics, 
which assumes that public decision-making is in average of poorer quality than private 
decision-making. (p.5) His own interest in policy-making, he explains, 
                                                 
6 This is a very peculiar article, where the two authors, Hirschman and Lindblom, explicitate the 
differences in their points of view.  
7 Syrquin (1992), however, argues that this operationality was more illusory than real.    7
goes considerably beyond the traditional concept of good government, which refers 
normally to the quality of public decision-making within a given social and 
institutional framework. Good government includes for us emphatically, if rather 
unusually, the ability to effect important changes or reforms in this framework 
itself. (Journeys, p. 6) 
In Chapter 1 Hirschman describes the various steps and political discussions that led to 
the creation of the Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast (SUDENE), by 
the Brazilian president Juscelino Kubitschek, in 1959. He begins by characterizing 
Brazil´s Northeast as a national problem area for the (then) last 80 years or so, 
periodically suffering from severe droughts, which affected a huge population, and with a 
very uneven land tenure system. He describes the creation of a new financial agency, the 
Banco do Nordeste, a regional banking institution, and mentions the important role 
played by the Brazilian economist Celso Furtado, who was appointed Superintendent of 
Sudene.
8   
Chapter 2 is devoted to land use and land reform in Colombia. After a thourough 
historical reconstruction, in which he challenges the dominant idea of  the persistence of  
“feudal patterns” in Latin America, Hirschman proceeds to analyse the several laws that 
were issued by the Colombian authorities to reform the land tenure system. Those 
included Law 200 of 1936, followed in 1949 by the implementation of fiscal measures for 
bringing pressure on landowners to cultivate their holdings, and by the land reform 
established through the adoption of Law 135 in 1961, signed by President Alberto Lleras. 
An interesting section of the chapter foccuses the advantages and limitations of a foreign 
mission´s recommendations (The Strategy, p.117), a subject to which he would go back 
many times in Journeys. 
Chapter 3 deals with the problem of inflation in Chile. Once again, the subject is 
introduced by a detailed historical reconstruction, beginning with in the 1830s and 
passing through Courcelle-Seneuil, the University of Chile´s first professor of economics. 
In 1860 Courcelle-Seneuil helped the government to produce a banking law which 
established the principle of free banking. The return to the gold standard in 1925 is 
defined as a significant episode in Chile´s recent history, marked by the the influence of 
the Kemmerer Mission, named after the North American professor who came to the 
country as a consultant to the government. Although the bills enacted in 1925 avoided 
some of the mistakes committed in the previous years, claims the author, they once more 
conveyed the risks associated with a strict application of imported doctrines in foreign 
countries. In his own words, 
…the experience again left a most bitter taste. It displayed once more that 
propensity […] to take imported doctrines more seriously and to apply them more 
rigidly and dogmatically in a foreign country than in their country of origin.” 
(Journeys, p.180)  
Then came the “radical” years of 1939-1952, when inflation rates rose steadily at an 
average yearly rate of 18 per cent, reaching 70 per cent in 1954. Hirschman attributes the 
“prolonged complacency toward inflation” in Chile during this period to the atmosphere 
                                                 
8 Before that, Furtado had worked for the ECLA.   8
of world-wide inflation prevailing during WWII and the immediate postwar years. 
Inflation was seen by the Central Bank´s authorities as the price to be paid for rapid 
economic expansion. Nevertheless, in 1949 the government addressed to the UN and 
subsequently to the IMF a request for a foreign advisory mission. The two missions came 
to Chile aproximately at the same time. Although there were prestigious economists in 
both teams, adds Hirschman, those missions “were condemned to futility from the start”. 
(Journeys, p. 191)  
In 1955-6 a new foreign mission came to help the monetary authorities to fight inflation: 
the Klein-Saks Mission. Hirschman reports that public order in Santiago was then 
constantly threatened by strikes and other public demonstrations, to a point where the 
army began to camp in the streets, trying to assure constitutional order. The Ibañez 
government then decided to contract a consulting firm (Klein & Saks) headed in 
Washington, who had previously worked in Peru.  
Discussing the effectiveness of the recommendations set up by this new mission, 
Hirschman concludes that its technical contribution was minimal, since it relied on 
existing plans and ideas.
9 However, replicating what happened in the Kemmerer case, the 
role of this mission was important in cementing a new political coalition. At this point, 
Hirschman concludes that 
The mission appears in this context essentially as a device permitting the 
contending groups to evade once again their responsibility to hammer out a 
workable compromise in face-to-face discussions. (Journeys, p. 209) 
Hirschman then proceeds to discuss the tenets and main propositions of the so-called 
structuralist school of inflation, an original doctrine elaborated by Latin American 
economists. Instead of seing inflation as the fundamental evil of the Chilean society to 
inflation, as was the case with other currents of thought, structuralists argued that the 
search for general causes underlying inflation problems may help society to fight these 
various problems. In order to eliminate inflation, basic structural reforms in the economy 
were necessary.  
After this long review of the economic history of Brazil, Colombia and Chile, Hirschman 
devotes Chapter 4 to the following question: is there a Latin American style of problem-
solving and policy-making? To answer this question, he introduces on p. 238 a French 
expression which would turn out to be central in his thinking: la rage de vouloir conclure 
(the anger of wanting to conclude). By using this expression he intends to characterize the 
problem-solving style of latecomers. No doubt, this characterization is highly contextual: 
pressing social problems such as the ones expressed by Colombian campesinos, the 
hungry Nordestinos in Brazil and the Chilean workers demanded quick answers from the 
policy-makers, who needed to address their actions, at first, merely to pacify the protests. 
This would often lead them to jump to a ready-made solution, since  
                                                 
9 Hirschman goes back to the “visiting-economist syndrome” in Dissenters (p. 93), defining it as 
“the habit of issuing peremptory advice and prescritption by calling on universally valid 
economic principles and remedies (…) after a strictly minimal acquaintance with the ´patient´”. I 
will go back to this point in the conclusion.   9
Urged on by pressing problems and by the desire to catch up, and liberally supplied 
with recipes communicated to them by the advanced countries of both East and 
West, their policy-makers are only too ready to believe that they have achieved full 
understanding and to act on the basis of this belief. (Journeys, p. 240)  
At this point Hirschman goes back to a subject about which he had already talked in The 
Strategy, which concerns the special problems of latecomers in the industrialization 
process. All they can do, he had argued in The Strategy, is to follow a trail that others 
opened a long time ago. However, by assuming this derived type of development, they 
might face additional obstacles of a psychological nature, which involve “a vague 
resentment against the new ways, a secret hope that the equipment/ methods will not 
work out in our millieu.” (The Strategy p.139)  
This ambivalent atitude is further discussed in Journeys, where Hirschman coins a 
significative expression to picture it: “failure complex” (p.240). From the rage de vouloir 
conclure he moves to this second expression, which denotes what he considered to be a 
“self-deprecatory style of policy-making” observed among Latin American politicians. In 
a nutshell, failure complex – fracasomania, as he calls it in an article published in 1968 
and reprinted in Bias – refers to the tendency to consider problems as either wholly 
unsolved or as totally solved. Driven by a compulsive desire to solve all problems as 
rapidly as possible (la rage…), policy-makers are bound to search for a “fundamental” 
solution, for which they count on foreign counselling.
 10 The often excessive enthusiasm 
with which foreign missions and experts are greeted at their arrival in a Latin American 
country
11 would be part of this ambivalent pattern. There was no rejection, but, instead, 
an attitude of acceptance qualified by (unconscious) sabotage.     
The three stories told in Journeys have some examples of this collective psychological 
trait, as Hirschman would later explain in more details. The agrarian reform promoted by 
the Colombian government in the 1930s did induce changes in a desirable direction, but it 
was always interpreted as a complete failure. In Brazil´s Northeast some public initiatives 
to fight the repeated drought problem were seen as totally inefficient, although they were 
rather successful. (Crossing, p.100) 
Against this search for the all-encompassing solution to problems of development 
Hirschman argues in favor on emphasizing incremental gains and a problem-solving 
strategy. As Coser (1984, p. 166) points out, the author sees development as the creation 
of institutional means to bring potential resources to life. There is no predetermined royal 
road to this end; everything depends on creative solutions applied to concrete 
circumstances.   
                                                 
10 It is interesting to point that the fact that Hirschman called his new book on development 
economics “A Bias for Hope” clearly reveals his intention to counteract this fracasomania. 
11 Hirschman states that although the concept occurred as a result of his experience with policy 
making in Latin America, it also reflects his Italian experience. (Crossing, p. 100)   10
3.  Development Projects 
The book Development Projects Observed, published in 1967, concentrates in the 
analysis of the microeconomic aspects of development, such as the construction and 
maintenance of highways, eletric power stations and irrigation schemes. The empirical 
material in the book concerns 11 World Bank´s projects that were then scattered around 
the world, comprising irrigation projects in southern Italy, Peru and Thailand, 
telecommunications in Ethiopia, railways in Nigeria,  a pulp and paper industry in 
Pakistan etc. In beginning of the book Hirschman explains that he made an effort to look 
“beyond technology”, emphasizing, rather, the social and cultural environment where 
development projets are embedded. 
A major chapter, entitled “Latitudes and Disciplines” (Chapter 3), deals with a large 
variety of pressures for performance stemming from various characteristics of the projet: 
spatial or locational latitude, temporal discipline in construction, tolerance for corruption, 
latitude in substituting quantity for quality, private for public outlays and so on. The 
conception of latitude originates from the empirical observations contained in Chapter 8 
of The Strategy, about the superior performance of latecomers in the maintenance of 
airplanes as compared to highways. From this empirical evidence Hirschman concluded 
that a certain type of capital-intensive, advanced technology could be more appropriate to 
a country with little industrial tradition than the labor-intensive technology.  
In Development Projects (p. 86) Hirschman defines latitude as the characteristic of a 
project or task that permits the planner and operator to mold it, or to let it slip, in one 
specific direction, regardless of outside occurrences. His main argument has to do with 
the greater or smaller latitude in standards of performance prevailing in a given industrial 
activity. When this latitude is narrow (which implies a low tolerance for poor 
performance) the corresponding task has to be performed in a clearly defined right 
manner, otherwise it cannot be performed at all or is exposed to a considerable level of 
risk. Airplanes, for example, involve a high probability of crash, with dramatic 
consequences. The same does not apply to highways, where performance standards and 
risks involved are much lower.  
All the above mentioned categories proved quite useful in understanding the specific 
difficulties and achievements in the different projects visited by Hirschman. As he 
sophisticates his conception of latitude, he gains a better understanding of it and, at the 
same time, a more qualified  position: lack of latitude, he claims, has the advantage of 
determinateness, of preventing mere slippage, accelerating decision making processes 
and providing project managers with firm discipline and guideposts for action. While in 
some situations the presence of latitude was useful in fostering the adaptation of imported 
models of economic behavior to local conditions and requirements. (Development 
Projects, p.127), in others, lack of latitude favored changes that take place 
discontinuously, involving new values and types of behavior. (Development Projects, 
p.139) 
Hirschman´s experience with World Bank´s projects led him to distinguish two types of 
decision: i) to accept some “status quo traits” of the environment as temporarily 
unchangeable characteristics and ii) to consider certain other traits as subject and ready 
for the kind of changes that are necessary for the project to be successful. (Development   11
Projects, p. 131) Through an analogy with price theory, he calls the first decision “trait-
taking” and the second one “trait-making”. The failure of railroad project in Nigeria, he 
concludes, was due to a large amount of trait-making required for its success, as 
compared to highway transportation, which was not nearly as demanding.    
In this connection, another central concept in Development Projects is the so-called 
principle of the hiding hand, a metaphor to which Hirschman would return in his later 
writings. At first sight, it´s ancestor is Adam Smith´s invisible hand; however, Hirschman 
claims that it is the Weberian concept of unintendent consequences of human action.  By 
employing this metaphor the author explores one of his dearest ideas, which is the search 
for possible hidden rationalities.  
How does the hiding hand work in concrete situations? Development projects are subject 
to two kinds of potential developments: unsuspected threats, on the one hand; and 
unexpected remedial actions that can be taken whenever the former become real, on the 
other. Project planners may ignore or underestimate the extent of trait-making that a 
given project requires;
12 should they have complete information about the difficulties 
involved in its implementation, they might have decided to abandomn it; in so doing, 
however, they would never reach the alternative solutions that might later turn out to be 
the true handicap of their project.  In a pasture improvement project in Uruguay, for 
example, technical change required a lot of social, institutional and attitudinal 
transformation. The landowners did not realize that, and decided to adopt the new 
techniques just because they looked financially attractive and socially prestigeous. Once 
they adopted them, however, they realized that they were compelled to make substantial 
changes in their way of life, and the hiding hand acted to accommodate those changes.  
4.  From a methodological point of view 
After reviewing the basic content of the trilogy that Albert Hirschman wrote by 
inspiration of his Latin American professional experience, I will dedicate this concluding 
section to comment on a few methodological aspects of the author´s approach, which can 
be found in the three books that are here analysed and tend to persist in his later writings.  
The first characteristic - perhaps the most important one, for a paper to be presented at the 
ECHE 2004 - is a deliberate attempt to trespass disciplinary boundaries. In this respect 
Journeys is an emblematic piece, where Hirschman expressely reveals his disposition to 
explore the political aspects of development. This was not the first time that he crossed 
the frontier between economics and political science,
13 and he continued to do so 
throughout his career. In the trilogy and elsewhere in his writings, Hirschman is a 
political economist in the broader sense of the term. 
Still another example is the link that can be established between Development Projects 
and one of Hirschman´s best known books, Exit, published more than a decade later. 
(Hirschman 1970) As the author later realized, there is a deep affinity between the 
                                                 
12 This anticipates the concept of cognitive dissonance, which would later turn to be popular 
among economists. 
13 See, for example, his National Power ant the Structure of Foreign Trade, published in 1945.   12
concept of latitude, to which the reader is introduced in the former, and the concept of 
voice, discussed in the latter. (Hirschman 1984, p. 100) As said before, a narrow latitude 
in standards of performance prevailing in a particular economic activity can be rational 
for underdeveloped countries, rendering their management efficient, since a poor 
performance in those narrow latitude activities tends to originate strong public concern 
and protests. Here lies the connection with the concept of voice, which stands for political 
action. By means of this second concept Hirschman stresses the significant role that 
political action plays in many economic processes. Voice is not a substitute for the 
market, nor an obstacle to its functioning; it is a second generally available mechanism 
that social actors consider in their choices. Therefore, economists concerned with 
development issues should focus the general context in which economic decisions are 
made.  
This tendency to trespass disciplinary boundaries is not an occasional characteristic of 
Hirschman´s writings, neither does it involve only the border line between economics and 
political science. Rather, it seems to be a conscious parti-pris, by means of which the 
author finds help in analytical tools borrowed from political science, but also from human 
sciences such as psychology and philosophy, and, more generally, from disciplines such 
as linguistics.
 14 For Meldolesi (1995, p. 57), The Strategy  is already the result of a cross-
fertilization of continents, cultures, and disciplines: 
The Strategy grew out of work in the field and was the result of a cross-fertilization 
of experiences, disciplines, and cultures during the course of a complex itinerary 
across three continents.  
In Hirschman´s work, trespassing the frontiers between disciplines seems to be 
homologous to trespassing geographical frontiers, cultures, and life experiences. The 
acquaintance with all those domains might explain the originality of his approach to 
economic problems. The habit of crossing boundaries seems to have opened his  
perception to hypotheses beyond mere economics, thus developing his sensibility toward 
concepts that are now common knowledge among specialists, such as bounded 
rationality, cognitive dissonance, transaction costs, market failure, etc. In his effort to 
redefine the scope of Political Economy, Hirschman favored a more complex and 
profound account of his subject matter, which is at the same time a symptom and a cause 
of this positive attitude towards multidisciplinary research.  
In Bias for Hope, where he once more explores the political dimensions of economic 
phenomena, Hirschman (1971, p.1) claims that this tendency to trespass disciplinary 
boundaries comes “almost naturally” in connection with any problem that he happens to 
be attacking. Although this broad outlook was not unusual among economists at the time 
he wrote his trilogy, it seems to be more intense in his particular case. (I venture to say 
that this sort of  “non challance” toward disciplinary boundaries is responsible for the 
cohesive character that his writings acquired throughout his career.) 
The other comments that I want to make in this conclusion have to do with two other 
methodological aspects, closely connected to a “trespassing” attitude. They consist in a 
                                                 
14 I plan to devote a second article to another example of this “trespassing atitude” where 
psychoanalysis comes in, which involves the concept of fracasomania.   13
straight connection between theoretical work and policy recommendations, on the one 
hand, and a thorough concern with empirical research, on the other.   
As said before, Hirschman decided to move to Latin America with the goal of studying 
the problem of development in backward countries. (Crossing p. 80) It was not a a purely 
intellectual mission.He wanted to study the causes of underdevelopment and how large-
scale reform policies could be carried out to provide a solution. This suggests that, from 
the very beginning, there was a mixture of positive and normative elements in 
Hirschman´s work. Concern with political relevance led him to work on two 
simultaneous fronts: a theoretical one, which implied building a theory to explain 
underdevelopment, and a pratical one, which involved discussing a set of policy 
recommendations to cope with it. 
The third methodological feature that its worth stressing in this paper is that, unlike many 
economists, Hirschman does not endorse the idea that the basic job of a social scientist is 
to discover and stress regularities, stable relationships, uniform sequences etc.. Alejandro 
(1984) points out that Hirschman has been a rebel against the simplifications, banalities, 
and limitations of practical ortodoxy and heterodoxy, and he did so by learning from his 
empirical work. He did not manipulate a large mass of statistical data and submitted them 
to sophisticated econometric techniques, as a contemporary fellow would do. He 
basically relied on direct observation (visiting the projects, listening to the people, 
meeting with government officials and so on) and on the historical reconstitution of 
relevant institutions (agrarian laws in Colombia, a regional bank in Brazil and so many 
others).   
Albert Hirschman realized that certain structural characteristics of underdeveloped 
economies made orthodox analysis inapplicable and misleading. He wanted “to underline 
the multiplicity and creative disorder of the human adventure, to bring out the uniqueness 
of a certain occurrence, and to perceive and entirely new way of turning a historical 
corner”, and his biography is emblematic of this attitude: not only he decided to live in a 
very poor continent such as Latin America was in the 1950s, he also bothered to learn the 
language and to visit the countryside, interacting with Latin American politicians, 
intellectuals, workers and other social groups. Of course, he went to Latin America with 
some prior theoretical conceptions after all, but he was ready to abdicate of them if 
empirical investigation proved them wrong. When he arrived in Colombia,  he was 
determined “to understand better their [the Colombians´s] patterns of action, rather than 
assume from the outset that they could only be ´developed´ by importing a set of 
techniques they knew nothing about”. (Dissenters, p. 91)  
This points to a very interesting idea that Hirschman began to conceive in The Strategy 
and further developped in other writings, what he would later call “the visiting-economist 
syndrome”. Specialists´s missions that were sent to underdeveloped countries with the 
aim of giving them technical assistance often fell on this syndrome. In a nutshell, it 
consisted on issuing policy recommendations without a close examination of the 
empirical conditions prevailing in the region. In Dissenter´s, Hirschman (1984) uses 
irony to tell the reader that when he went to Colombia the World Bank expected him (as 
was the case with all its foreign experts) to rapidly formulate some ambitious plan for 
economic development, employing the ready-made techniques that he had learned:   14
All of this was alleged to be quite simple for experts mastering the new 
programming technique: apparently there now existed adequate knowledge, even 
witout close study of local surroundings, of the likely ranges of savings and capital-
output ratios, and those estimates, joined to the country´s latest national income and 
balance of payments accounts, would yield all the key figures needed. (Hirschman 
1984, p. 90) 
Reacting to this posture, Hirschman questioned the automatic application of orthodox 
remedies to the problems of underdevelopment. In his opinion, instead of relying on 
general principles and abstract prescriptions, the foreign adviser should carry “an 
empirical lantern” and make “a visit with the patient” before being able to diagnose what 
was wrong with him. (Hirschman 1998, p. 88)  This general attitude involved regular 
conversations with Latin American policymakers and entrepreneurs, so that foreign 
specialists could acquire a perception  about the way investment decisions were taken. In 
other words, the foreign adviser should begin his work by engaging on a thorough 
empirical research of his “cases”, in order to grasp their peculiarities and unusual aspects.  
This means that Hirschman did not abdicate the pretense of building an universal theory, 
but argued, instead, that a theory in the social sciences cannot acquire an universal scope 
without paying due respect to the historical, geographical and institutional diversity of its 
subject matter. At a later point in his career, the author realized that there was a type of 
“unexpected consequence” effect in his own process of theory building: he had the 
intention of building a theory specially suited to the underdeveloped countries and ended 
up by finding a valid approach for understanding change and growth in other developing 
and advanced countries as well. As pointed out by Meldolesi (1995, p. 161) his move 
from Development Projects to Exit was equivalent to a dislocation from backward to 
advanced countries. But Hirschman´s intellectual career would later be consciously 
pursued in both directions. Looking for the specific, he went full circle and met the 
universal, as he says in the quotation below, with which I close this paper: 
It appears, therefore, that the very characteristics on which I had sought to build an 
economics specially attuned to the underdeveloped countries have a far wider, 
perhaps even a universal, range and that they define, not a special strategy for the 
development for a well-defined group of countries, but a much more generally valid 
approach to the understanding of change and growth. In other words, I set out to 
learn about others, and in the end learned about ourselves. (Hirschman 1984, p. 
95 – emphasis added) 
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